F1·encli Intervention in Spain and Its. Reaction in Texas
385
that there were 1,050 troops in Texas, a force he considered totally inadequate for effective defence even when strengthened by armed vol- unteers. He had declared that valor alone could not defeat the better disciplined and numerically superior Americans, and added that the advantages of the Americans were being further improved by their trading activity among the natives of the province. In view of the circumstances, Cordero had recommended that 3,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and a field artillery train be sent to Texas. The main body of troops, he believed, should be stationed at San Antonio; an adequate number of well-mounted and well-equipped men should be assigned to keep communications open with the frontier outposts: Nacog- doches, Orcoquisac, Atascosito, Bayou Pierre, and La Bahia; and adequate detachments should be stationed at all these outposts, as well as along the coast to keep an effective lookout for any hostile move on the part of natives or foreigners. Merely the knowledge of such a force in Texas, he thought, would restrain the Americans. He went on to paint a gloomy and apprehensive picture of the danger threatening the province and of the serious inroads being made by American traders among the Indians. To counteract their influence, he urged the immediate establishment of two or three trading posts convenient to the various Indian tribes, where the natives in exchange for pelts and stock could secure from the Span- iards the goods they desired. At the same time he had suggested the organization of local presidia! companies in San Antonio, La Bahia, and Nacogdoches, to form the nucleus for a provincial militia, similar to the home guards of Natchi- toches. Both the regular troops and the presidia! companies, he had advised, sorely needed military instruction and more rigid discipline. 80 The commandant general had replied early in September that the request for 4,500 troops was preposterous. The entire viceroyalty of New Spain had hardly that many. But even if the men were available and could be sent to Texas, the condition of the province was such that the men could not be properly quartered or adequately supplied. The lack of good roads, the difficult passage of flood-swollen rivers, and the unhealthful climate of the coast region would nullify the effective use of a force as large as Cordero requested. At that time N. Salcedo was inclined to minimize the danger of attack from the United States.
• 0 cordero to N. de Salcedo, August 29, 1807. Nacogdoclus Arclliv4s, XI, pp. 58-66.
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