Our Catlzoli& Heritage in T ezas
moderate impost. Bonavia made the significant observation that when need and private interest unite, "there is no army or measure capable of stopping contraband trade." For this reason it would be better to remove the cause of smuggling than to continue futile attempts to repress it. 78 But the flagrant case of De la Rosa before the commandant general at this very time blinded his reason and convinced him of the perversity of the unscrupulous smugglers seeking admission into Texas under false pretexts. He remained adamant after the December storm brought the De la Rosa case to an end. Bonavia wrote Saavedra a dispirited letter in which he gave the Secretary of State a full report on the case and on all his own efforts to induce the commandant general to put into execution the order of the king authorizing the opening of a free port in Texas. He felt discouraged, he said, by the indifference of higher officials in attending to the more imm~diate and urgent needs of the province. He deplored the lack of energy that characterized the Govern- ment in New Spain and the damnable practice of recurring to "endless ezpedientes which of necessity consume very much time." His patience exhausted, Bonavia spoke out his mind and fearlessly warned that if conditions were not remedied immediately, the time would come when the colonies would take things into their own hands. This was a daring prophecy to make, but it reveals how thoroughly the new commander had analyzed the critical situation facing Spanish authority in America. "Regardless of the wisdom of the commandant general," he exclaimed, "these provinces will continue to waste their slender resources and ultimately be consumed, if they are not given effective and immediate aid by the viceroy until they are in a position to help them- selves. . . . I express what I feel and the way I feel, because I am interested in the welfare of the Monarchy. The United States is watch- ing our every move and will not hesitate to take advantage of our mistakes." 79 But the royal officials in Spain continued to support the policies of the viceroy and the commandant general. T ezas militia. As early as August, 1807, Cordero had urged the mobilization of 4,500 men for Texas and the organization of the inhab- itants into a well-trained and disciplined militia that could be depended upon to support the troops stationed in the province. In reply to an inquiry concerning military needs, he had informed Nemesio Salcedo 78 Bonavia to N. Salcedo, September 20, 1809. Ibid., pp. 264-266. 79 Bonavia to Saavedra, December 27, 1809. A. G. I., A11di1n&ia d1 Guadalajara, 104-2-25 (Dunn Transcripts, 1800-1819, p. 275).
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