First Claslees witli tlee United States
2 53
In his message to Congress, December 3, 1805, the President devoted a long paragraph to Spain. He explained that relations continued to be strained, that Spain had refused to ratify a previous claims conven- tion and that "preparations for adjusting amicably the boundaries of Louisiana have not been acceded to." He did not point out how the ambitious claim to all of Texas was the chief stumbling block. He went on to recite that Spaniards had trespassed on the territories of Orleans and Mississippi, had seized American citizens and had plun- dered property in American territory. He had, consequently, ordered the United States troops to protect "our citizens" and to repel future aggressions by force. Three days later Jefferson sent a special message to Congress "relative to the hostile spirit manifested by the court of Spain toward the United States," in which he practically asked for discretionary power to use the armed forces of the country to carry out his policy. He stated, after reviewing the relations since 1803, that the actions of Spain in the Floridas and Texas "authorized the inference of her intention to advance on our possessions until stopped by force." He concluded with these significant words: "Formal war is not necessary; it is not probable it will follow; but ... force should be interposed to a certain degree." 68 There is little room to doubt that the United States had determined, if necessary, to compel Spain to settle the pending question of the Louisiana boundary. What were the true facts concerning the actions of Spain on the Texas frontier? Documents available seem to indicate that her reaction was purely defensive and that she was extremely anxious to avoid a break with the United States. In April, 1805, Commandant General Nemesio Salcedo wrote Cordero, the new assistant governor of Texas, that he was to be guided in his conduct by three principal aims. The danger of being involved in a war with England made it imperative for him to do everything possible: first, to maintain friendly relations with the Indians; second, to avoid altering the status quo on the Spanish-American frontier; and third, to keep a close vigilance against any surprise along the coast. To enable him to accomplish these aims, the light-mounted company of Parras and other troops from Coahuila had been ordered to San Antonio. Cordero was, furthermore, authorized to call on volunteers from the settlements in Texas if an emergency arose. 69 61 Message of the President, December 6, 1805. StaJe Pa;ns and Public/J Docu- ments, II, 4-6. 69 Nemesio Salcedo to the Governor of Texas, April 8, 1805. Nacogdocl14s Ar- c/Jives, X, pp. 19-20.
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