Reorganization and New Policies, 1770-1800
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Indian ,policy of Viceroy Galvez. In 1785, Bernardo Galvez, count of the same name, who had distinguished himself by his services in Louisiana during the struggle of the English colonies for independence, was appointed viceroy of Mexico. His experience and intimate acquaint- ance with Indian affairs had prepared him in a large measure for his new task. It was natural that he should turn his attention to the most pressing problem, that of the northern frontier. On August 26, 1786, he prepared a long set of instructions for Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola, the new commandant general of the Interior Provinces, designed to guide him and all the frontier commanders in their relations with the Indians in their respective provinces. The influence of Rubi, Croix, Ripperda, and Cabello, as well as that of Lamathe and Gasiot, is evident in the general instructions. He emphatically stated that the Apaches were the worst enemies of the Interior Provinces. "They are the cause of their desolation," he declared, "the enemies most to be feared because of their treachery, their warlike customs, their habit of stealing for a livelihood, and their knowledge of our strength." While their actual number has been greatly exaggerated, nevertheless, their rapidity of movement and constant roaming made them a formidable enemy. In view of these facts, the first concern of commanders should be to protect all exposed frontiers and wage an incessant campaign against bands marauding in the vicinity of their respective posts. This would prevent attack. Frequent raids at unexpected times should be made upon their temporary camps. Experience had shown the futility of large scale operations or formal campaigns against them. Such enterprises had proved costly and worthless on account of the inability to maneuver with the necessary dispatch and secrecy. In fighting Indians on the frontier it was necessary to adopt their own strategy. The chief element was surprise. Success depended on it. Quick and telling blows alone would eventually either .exterminate or bring to subjection these nomadic tribes. The ideal number for such campaigns was from one hundred fifty to two hundred soldiers, well mounted and armed, and unimpeded by trains of supplies or bulky baggage. Frontier troops, furthermore, should be commanded by officers who were experienced in Indian warfare, regardless of their age or rank. Troops in frontier presidios should always be ready to pursue raiding Indians. The report of marauders should be followed up by tracking them down immediately. Time was the most important element. The
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