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Our Catl,olic Heritage in Texas
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afforded them against the Indians would in a short time more than offset the initial expense.1 5 Tl,e military resources of Texas. The actual number of men in the two remaining presidios after the reorganization of the northern frontier in accord with the new regulations of 1772 was one hundred seventy- six soldiers, nine officers, and two chaplains. This gave the Presidio of Bejar and the Presidio of La Bahia eighty-eight men each, not including the officers. But not all this force could be used to fight the Lipans and Apaches because some had to do guard duty, while others had to look after the horses, provide escorts, and carry the mail. These indispensable duties left only sixteen men available in San Antonio for campaigns against the Indians and thirty-three in La Bahia. It was preposterous to rely on any effective aid from the friendly Indians of the north in the war against the Apaches and the Comanches. Indian allies were more of a liability than an asset. They had to be humored constantly, supplied with horses, arms, ammunition, and pro- visions; and they could never be relied upon on account· of their lack of discipline, their fickle nature, and their irresponsible character. Governor Cabello called attention to the fact that the Gilefios, while belonging to the same family as the Lipans, Mescaleros, and Apaches, and while having the same habits and customs, lived far to the west along the Gila River from which they derived their name. They, there- fore, constituted no danger to the Interior Provinces of Nuevo Leon, Nuevo Santander, and Texas. "If His Majesty," declared the governor, "cannot afford at this time the expense necessary for the war [against the Apaches], the time will soon come when his dominions in this region will be totally lost and his vassals will find themselves obliged to abandon their homes and property and move to places where, in spite of poverty and misery, they may find protection for their lives and those of their wives and children." The commandancy-general, with its limited resources, could neither afford any effective aid nor remedy the sad situation of the Interior Provinces. 16 Danger from the United States. A French Indian agent, Juan Gasiot, with remarkable foresight, called the attention of the new commandant general, Felipe Neve, in 1783 to the grave danger which 15 Governor Cabello to Viceroy Galvez, September 30, 1784. A. G. M., Provincias /nternas, Vol. 64, pp. 142-149. 16 /bid., pp. l 50-157.
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