The Papers of Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, Volume IV, part 2

108

'l'ExAs STATE LrnnARY

between the two nations; but this hope has been gradually diminishing, until I am now satisfied that it is not to be realized; and I have almost come to the conclusion, that the Treaty will not be ratified at all. I regret this exceedingly, not so much on account of any interest my gov- ernment may have in the matter, as because of the consequences to Nicaragua; which, by rejecting the treaty, will not only place herself in a wrong position towards a friendly power, but .will lose an opportunity which may not soon ocurr again, of laying a solid foundation for her future prosperity, and of securing the perpetuity of her national Souv- reignty and independence. - In my opinion the ratification of the Treaty is a matter of the highest possible importance to this country; in com- parison with which, all other questions, at this moment, sink into in- significance; for it must be evident to all, that there is a great crisis in the affairs of Nicaragua, whose present and future destiny is suspended, as it were, by a single thread, and dependant for good or for evil, upon the course which may be taken with respect to this Treaty. How then, does it happen that a measure of such vital importance, im·olving almost the very existence of the nation, should have been suffered to remain so long unsettled - especially when it is obvious to all, that every hour of delay only increases those perils and perplexities which it is the object of that treaty to avert and terminate? The Treaty has been some months before this government, during which time it has been scanned, scrutinized, examined and conned over and over again, until it has, almost like a schoolboy's lesson, been comitted to memory; and yet to all appereance, its ratification or rejection remains in as much doubt and uncertainty as it did on the day of its reception. What is the cause of this delay? I am told that the inaction of the government has been occasioned, in part, by the consultation which it deemed necessary to hold with the other States of Central America, before taking final action in the matter. This was not unreasonable nor useless; but on the contrary, it was nat- ural and proper; for although these States have no political connection with each other, they are nevertheless united by natural ties and mutual sympathies - by similarty of interests, and the prospects of a common destiny; and, therefore, was it respectful and judicious to consult them upon a measure of so much gravity as that of the Treaty. - There can be no ground of complaint upon this score; but now that these States have had ample time to respond to the call made upon them; and as some of the most influential of them have already made their response, · and in a manner favorable to the treaty, ~ can see no.motive for further delay on the part of this government; but on the contrary, I think there are considerations of the strongest nature in favor of immediate and decisive action. Prompt ratification will procure the confidence of the United States, give credit to Nicaragua, and bring to her immediate relief and certain prosperity. It will not only cause the Transit to be opened at once; but it will be the means of allaying the asperities grow- ing out of past cwnts, and C(•menting the two countries by the indis- soluble ties of social communion and mutual commercial adrnntage. What then can be the motives of this exceeding rcpugnnnce to immediate action? What nre the reasons for thi:; perilous po~tponement? - Does it proceed from the principle of putting off the evil day as long as possible? If this be the case, - if the Trenty is to

Google

Powered by