457
PAPERS OF MIRABEAU BuoNAI•AitT1, LAMAR
to themselves. According to our conception of the matter, Mina ought to have done one of two things-either to have remained at Soto la Marina and met Arredondo; or to have taken with him, in his march for the interior the entire force of his expedition. In either event. he would have had his hands full. Whether he should remain or depart, the perils by [which] he was surrounded, and the alarming odds which he would have to encounter, imperiously demanded the union and co- operation of the whole command. The attempt to penetrate into the inter[i]or of the country with only a portion of his troops; about 270; was an undertaking sufficiently desperate and rash; but the leaving behind him 100 men to protect themselves against the formidable force which was then marching upon them, was a measure still more un- reasonable, and one which aparently admits of no apology.- We do not pretend to say that this division of his force, was the cause of his subsequent calamities; for we think it more than probable that under any arrangements his defeat was inevitable, rendered so by the divided and unsettled condition of the patriots rather than by the weakness of his force. Had his command remained united; and been stronger than it really was, the general result of his expedition would have been the same. The want of co-operation on the part of the patriot chiefs and the prevailing indisposition of the party to sustain h~m, rendered! success impossible and defeat inevitable; and we have objected to the· division whi-ch he made of his command at Sota la Marina only because it strikes us as a movement altogether unreasonable & astonishing in a General of such undoubted talents and long experience as Mina.- Had he been ever so successful in his own adventurers, it would not have saved the one hundred that he left behind exposed to the vengeance of Arredondo.- It was like dooming them to death; and could have no forgiveness for an error so palpable and fatal, if it were not for the fact that it [was] the only one committed by this extraordinary hero in his whole carreer.- Commenced 24 May-25 was conducted by a guide thro' obscure paths- had nothing but beef to eat. suffered much from the boiling sun. Came· to an hacienda, where they tarried the night- The two next days. 26 & 27th, brought them by rapid & secret march, to the hacienda to. which La Mora had retired; here some of the property formerly cap- tured by Perry was found, and was appropriated as far as it was neces- sary to the comfort of the party. This was about 25 leagues from Soto la :Marina. Next day 28 crossed the river Altamira where they lost one man Lt.. Gabet. This was at the town of Horcasitas.- Next day 29 went 5 le~gues to hacienda clown the stream & halted for· the day.- here they captured 700 horses-sever [e] loss to the enemy.- Afternoon 30, Mina continued his march, his men mounted on the best of the captured horses, the remainder being driven along.- These horses were designed for his pursuit- sore loss- He however in three clays, one dark night, lost them all. 8th of June, in the morning, Mina was told by a peasant that the enemy from El Valle de Mais, was stationed on the road to intercept him. The division pushed on to encounter them; the out post or ad- vance guard was 200 Cavalry well posted & waiting; this was 3 leagueS: from El Valle de Mais. ~Iina attacked them they retreated with 5
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