PAPERS OJ<' :MIRABEAU BUONAPARTE LA~IAR 383 It is necessary that the employees appointed by the National. Gov- ernment should not be deputies or senators, in or_der that he who al- ready has the power of vetoing the laws which do not seem good to him, may not appoint deputies and senators, who for other considerations than those of the public good, may refuse to ratify the laws. A,nd since both bodies are his judges in the mistakes that he commits, this also may prevent the monstrosity of having his own agents as such. (The Constitution of 24 only prohibited deputies to be nominated from the employees of the Government, in the place in which they were exercising the duties of office, 3'Ild permitted any other to be a deputy, thus verifying the monstrosity that .those appointed by the President may reelect him, and his subalterns, who receive their ap- pointment from his hand, should be his judges. Consider the im- morality which such opposite functions would have involved in them- selves and the lamentable result in the opinion of all, whether well or badly executed, they would produce on the nation.) It is equally expedient that the deputies and senators may always be reelected, but should not be obliged to serve except after a period of intermission. Who will be so imprudent as to take away his power :from anyone who has discharged his duties well and entirely to his satisfaction, in order to experiment with another at the ex- pense of his interest? but since the will of the representatives whom the people or States may nominate is not consulted save for the fact that on being appointed they are obliged to serve because they have been elected, if the continuity of this service does prejudice their ·in- terests, it is not rigp.t that they be forced to serve to their injury all their life, and for this reason that limitation is placed which does not exempt them from being obliged to serve in the course of their life. (The Constitution of 24 committed this inconceivable err9r pro- hibiting the people from continuing in their powers those who have known how to discharge them, although these might wish to hold their offices. The reform of 35 took away this limitation but without distinguishing the different durations of the terms, it obliged them to serve with only the interval of one year which is not just respecting the senators who hold office six years, respecting the President and Vice-president who hold office four, as it will be respecting the depu- ties who serve only two.) We have the legislative power organized said the North Americans, it remains for us to establish the Executive and Judicial. With re- gard to the first we should consider that if, in order to give force to the laws we have thought it suitable to have recourse to the nation for appointing the deputies to Congress ·or. the house of representatives, more care should be put on the executive, we ought to try to give it to him in order that he may deserve it or,. better said, he may have the national vote. It is then proper that all the nation elect him by a majority of the votes, and if it does not come out that he is designated by a majority of the votes let the Congress choose him from among those having the majority. On account of this body having the same origin, and the character of being representative of the nation, and in order that the States may be satisfied concerning the examination of the votes, in a business so important it has been practiced with due exactness and integrity, the Senate will agree to the opening of the
Powered by FlippingBook