The Writings of Sam Houston, Volume III

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WRITINGS OF 5AM HOUSTON,. 1843

282

The division at La Grange may be expected in the greatest force to advance to Washington whilst the remainder of the division would diverge by San Felipe, and those at this point cross the Brasos, descend to the Bay and there concentrate the entire force of the invading army. They ,vould thus have the entire com- mand of our waters and the gulf and could sustain themselves, receiving supplies by water, and by the aid of cavalry harrass the country Eastward and as far as the T"rinity and forage upon the stock and numerous herds of cattle which abound in Texas. All this may not occur, and it is even possible that an invasion may not take place; but if the enemy possE>ss means and invade Texas, this is the plan of operations which a general would project- and experience has taught us that we are liable to suffer its execution before efficient resistance could be made. To prevent the success of such a plan, in case of invasion, will require all the military talent of the country with arms and ammunition sufficient for every fighting man, and some degree of discipline, with perfect subordination. Arrangements for this purpose should be timely and nothing hazarded upon the first rencounter with the enemy. If we permit ourselves to be involved in. an engagement with them and do not make our success decisive we may rely upon this truth: that though we have twenty thou- sand warrio1·s in Texas, three thousand will not be rallied at any one point for the confl,ict-unless they have confi.clence in· their leaders. Experience has also taught us that detached commands involve the country in the heaviest calamities and ensure inevitable destruction to both officers and men: The fall of the Alamo, the destruction of Johnson and Grant and Morris, the defeat and execution of Capt. King's party, with the command of Col. Ward, and the massacre of the unfortunate Fannin and his gallant band, are mainly attributed to a spirit which existed at that day, fostered by the General Council, of insubordination· to the lawful authority. Orders had been given for the destruction of the Alamo more than a month previous to its fall. The com- mands on the lower San Antonio, also, were directed to fall back upon the Guadalupe both before and after the advance of the invading army. These orders were not obeyed-disaster ensued, and panic was the consequence. But three hundred and seventy four men could be rallied at Gonzales, although, Texas ought to have mustered eight thousand capable of bearing arms. And though the enemy were pressing on the settlements, and every

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