The Writings of Sam Houston, Volume VIII

WRITINGS OF SAM HOUSTON, 1860

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shocking barbarities, which I have already reported to you, would cease at any early period, I would be loth to press upon the Fed- eral government a subject of even this importance, deeming that my former communications were sufficient to convince all of the importance, as well as the necessity of immediate action. The misfortunes to which we have been subject, since annexa- tion have, I think, demonstrated the fact that it is entirely useless to think of rendering protection to Texas by the regular army. In the first place, the Indians move on their forays with wonderful celerity, and it is ridiculous to suppose that infantry can afford any protection against such a foe, because they cannot go in pursuit, and if they did, it would be useless, and a subject of amusement and ridicule to the Indians. No one doubts the value of our regulars, or the skill of our officers. Both are a subject of pride to the country; but unless the Indians are fools enough to go up to a garrison and be shot down, garrisons will be of no use, only to shelter the inmates. If cavalry are sent to the frontier, they are generally mounted on fine American horses, accustomed to being fed on grain, which cannot be procured even at an enormous price; and if they could be grain-fed, they must be shod, or they are unable to give pursuit after Indians for more than a day without becoming "tender-footed" which is exceed- ingly detrimental to success. Were a Regiment of Texas Volunteers called out, and the ten companies stationed at ten different points on the line of our frontier, and patrols made to pass between the different stations, no Indians could pass into the settlements without their trails being discovered and pursuit given before they would [have] an opportunity to massacre and depredate upon our people. The only question, then, arising is, as to what description of troops will be most efficient for purposes of protection against the Indians. It is evident to my mind that Texas Rangers stand preeminent on the score of economy and usefulness. I have, I think, named reasons why the troops of the regular army are not effective in Indian warfare. I now propose to render reasons why the Texas rangers are superior, and the only class of troops fitted for such service. They are excellent horsemen, accustomed to hardships, and the horses of Texas, having been raised on grass, can perform service without requiring grain to subsist them, except to recruit their strength for a few days when returned from a hard scout.

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