WRITINGS OF SAM HOUSTON, 1832-1853
A vast amount of abuse is indulged in and errors alleged against me for ordering the retreat of the army from the Colorado,-·by persons inspired by passions of malice and hate only; yet in order to deceive the people, they assumed the role of public benefactors. Cowardice and want of military capacity is the basis of the ven- omous criticism. It is gravely asserted by my enemies, that if the policy of cer- tain military chieftains had prevailed the Texans would have crossed the river, annihilated the enemy and saved the people of the west from the ravages of war. If we are disposed to specu- late in ifs, we may as well discuss the other hypothetical if. If the Texas army had countermarched, crossed the river and attacked the enemy, and been defeated, what then? Let the wails of the fallen at the Alamo and Goliad answer. Such speculations, seriously engaged in, are as unprofitable and vain as they are V1c10us. It is virtually an attempt to reverse the decrees of Divine Providence. The past is at least, secure and unalterable. The only legitimate question that admits of serious discussion is, whether or not the retreat was in accordance with wise and prudent military strategy. When I reached the Colorado on my retreat from Gonzales, I expected to have been reinforced by Colonel Fannin's command,. . and intended at that point to have resisted the advance of the enemy; but my plans were thwarted by the failure of Colonel Fannin to reach me. You are all familiar with the cause. I had reliable information from my scouts that Santa Anna was advanc- ing with his army in detached columns. His force was estimated at seve:ri thousand five hundred men well supplied with means of transportation. The nature of the country west of the Colorado was such that he was able to mass his forces with rapidity. The force with which I had to meet the enemy consisted of six hundred and fifty men without artillery or means of transportation. I admit that many of my officers and privates did desire to cross the river at Beason's and attack the enemy, but no two could agree exactly as to how it should be done. After learning the views and plans of my officers and privates, I concluded to retreat in the direction of my reinforcements and supplies, with a hope of enticing the enemy to advance in detached columns; and when he was in a position, surrounded with difficult water courses to cross-at a proper time, strike him an effectual and decisive blow. When I look back upon the battle of San Jacinto and its sequence,
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