\VmT~NGS OF 5AM HOUSTON, 1336
437
over the Enemy at Sea? If we have not, an Army in possession of Matamoras would be liable to every disaster and even annihila- tion. ['Would] the possession of Matamoras by us offer any cor- responding advantage to [the] hazard? None, I apprehend. Our Army would be far advanced into the Enemy's Country, without reserve or succor- the Enemy could penetrate into Texas by way of Laredo and San Antonio and over-run it, or by means of transports, they could take possession of our Sea ports whilst rmr Army [would] be abstracted from all aid to the Country. Or suppose it you please that [that] should not be the case, the Enemy certainly would be induced to concentrate their whold force, for the purpose of retaking Matamoras. There would be [an] energy and efficiency on the part of Mexico in resisting in- vasion and wiping off the stain upon their national honor, that is not to be expected in prosecuting war distant from their homes. The hope of possessing spoils taken from the Enemy could not possibly be an adeqtiate compensation .for the adventure. If an Army was advancing upon Matamoras and successful resistance could not be offered to it, the Mexican citizens of the place would find means of transporting their effects to a distance, whilst the foreign merchants, and thl'y principally North Americans, would be subject to all the calamities and misfortunes consequent [upon] a license given to make spoils of the property taken from the Enemy. Discrimination in such cases cannot be made, the ex- pectation and wishes of the .. . seldom yield reflection when they have power to enforce them. By taking possession of Matamoras, or by its destruction, you cut off all commerce with a large portion of the Mexican people. This circumstance will have a tendency to call forth all their energies and to unite them in common cause against the invad- ers. A Texian army in Matamoras from its localities must neces- sarily be cut off from all connection with and succour from Texas. The grand object of our Military operations ought to be to guard our frontier against invasion, and to resist it if attempted. The project of taking Matamotas is directly opposed to this object, and to say the least of it, is as impolitic as hazardous. At a former period of our war it was a favorite project. I was then opposed to it. Its partial prosecution reduced Texas to the very verge of ruin. The slaughter of the Alamo, the massacre of Goliad and the desolation of the greater portion of Texas were the fruits of it; and I am frank in saying that I apprehend con- sequences no less disastrous. I am, therefore, most positively
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