467
PAPERS OF MIRABEAU BuoNAPARTE LAMAR
the ~ppropriations appear in our Commissioners Report, and its accom- panying correspondence, all of which will be submit[ted] to your con- sideration. It will be observed that the [Com]mission adjourned to meet again on the first of N[ov]ember, and the early attention of Congress is resp[ect]fully invited to the subject, as it will be im- pra[cti]cable to renew the labour or complete the work, [unless] some further appropriations are made for carrying it on. The act of the last Congress directing the principal portion of our Navy to be laid up in ordinary has not been carried into effect. One of the reasons for this is to be found in the prevailing opinion that existed shortly after the adjournment of Congress, that Mexico was negotiating in Europe with a prospect of success for a Naval force to contest our supremacy upon the Gulf. That such negotiations were going on, was so confidently asserted by the journals of the United States and so generally believed, as to create too strong a probability of its truth, for the President to disregard it; and when taken in con- nection with the fact that she had already actually contracted with a House in London, for an armed Steam Ship, which was expected to be ordered upon our Coast, were circumstances, which, in the opinion of the President, substantially involved the contingency contemplated in the fourth section of the Act. It is true that our enemy had made no actual demonstration on the Gulf, but as long as there existed such a strong probability of his doing so, for the Executive to have dis- banded the seamen and dismantled the ships, would not only have been impolitic and hazardous, but in his opinion, a violation, instead of a fullfilment of the true intent and meaning of the law. He there- fore deemed it his duty to defer the withdrawal of our flag from the Gulf, until the designs of Mexico should be more distinctly developed, and the result of the negotiations, which she was supposed to be mak- ing abroad for a Navy, could be fully ascertained or safely co_njectured. Very different consequences may attend the disbanding of a Navy from those of an Army. In a Country like Texas, where every citizen is by habit and experience a soldier, and every soldier competent to some command, a military force could be collected and officered in time for almost any emergency that might arise. But no such facilities attend the organization of a maritim[e] force. A Navy once disbanded can- not be re-assembled at the tap of the drum. Seamen are not [to be] found amongst rural people. Their home is [far from] the deep; and they can be collected and organi[zed] only by an expensive and pro- tracted process ; and n [ot] in time for unexpected difficulties. To dis- band, therefore, a set of experienced Naval Officers and a gallant crew at a moment when there exists a probability, that their services might be wanted to the defence of the Country, can never be a wise or pru- dent measure; nor can the Executive believe that such a course could ever meet the views of the enlightened legislators of the Nation. The situation of the revolted provinces of Mexico during this period, furnished an additional consideration for the further contin- uance of the policy adopted. Yucatan, Tabasco, and Campeachy, hav- ing confederated as an Independent Government, rendered it impor- tant that we should ascertain the position which they intended to oc- cupy towards us; and our Navy being already manned and provisioned,
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