The Papers of Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, Volume II

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PAPERS OF MIRABEAU BuoNAPARTE LAMAR

Long's Enterprise 1820 Chapter 3rd

vVe think the reader will agree with us in ascribing the failure of General Long's operations in 1819, to the want of pecuniary means. Had he been able to keep his command together, instead of scattering it as he was compelled to do, the repulsion of the force which was brought against him, would have been an easy task. The Spanish army did not exceed seven hundred men, and the troops of General Long, when consolidated, would have numbered fully three hundred and fifty-a, disparity from which there was nothing to fear; since it was well known that in all conflicts with the Castilian race, the Americans had never failed of victory when the odds against them, did not exceed two or three to one. This was abundantly exemplified in the wars of 1812 and '13 under Bernardo Gutierrez, and in the preceeding conflicts at Natches between the Spaniards and the Kempers. Very overwhelming indeed must he the numbers which can insure victory to the former in any collision with the latter. Had a battle ensued between the Division of Perez: and the united parties of General Long, there can be no doubt as to· what the result ,vould have been. Victory to the latter would have· been inevitable. ·wherefore then were the Americans divided? Why· were they formed into so many small commands and so widely sep-• arated? \Ve answer, because the means were wanted of keeping them consolidated. The disposition which General Long made of his forces was a measure of necessity, and not of choice. He arrived: at Nacogdoches with insufficient supplies; they were soon exhausted;: and his soldiers had to seek subsistence among the game of the forest. The merchandise which he brought with him into the country was his only resource; and to make that available, it had to be bartered with the Indians for horses and mules, and such commodi- ties as could be readily converted into cash. General Long had been greatly disappointed in the aid and sup- port which was due and expected from the original projectors of' the enterprise.-The small outfit-altogether inadequate for such; an undertaking-was the only assistance which he received from the friends of the cause. The promised supplies were never forthcom- ing. A few articles of subsistence had, indeed, been forwarded to him, but these were intercepted by the military authorities at Fort Jesup; so that Genl. Long, almost immediately on his arrival at Nacogdoches found himself neglected, unsustained, destitute of means, and left to scuffle by himself, and procure subsistence in the· best manner he could. Under these circumstances it is.very manifest that he could not have done otherwise than he did-he was com- pelled either to divide and scatter his command, or to abandon the: enterprise altogether.- We do not mean to reproach his friends and coadjutors in the- United States with any premeditated derelection of duty. They had entered into this matter in a moment of generous enthusiasm~ with.-

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