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T&'CAS STATE LIBRARY
appointing power, and their official responsibility to the people would be augmented by receiving office from their immediate representatives. But the appointment of the two principal officers in the direct man• agement and operations of the bank, (the president and cashier,) upon whose unbending honesty, and business talents, the safety of the institution must greatly depend, should be thrown upon as few persons as possible. ·when the election of such officers is made by joint ballot from candidates who may present themselves to the representatives of the people, it is needless to disguise the fact, that many influences emanating from the good, as well a,s the more selfish feelings of the human heart, might direct them in their choice, to the injury, if not utter ruin of the institution for the benefit of which they were acting. Besides, we all know that individual responsibility is lessened, in proportion to the numbers who are brought to act on a given subject, and in making appointments so vitally impor- tant to the safety of an institution in which the whole country will ha,ve so deep an interest, it may be well to throw upon the individuals in whom the power of appointment is made to vest, a responsibility in some degree commensurate with the importance of the' objects to be secured. It would perhaps be equally dangerous to entrust the power of appointment to a single person; for being single he would be more obnoxious to corruption. There is then but one alternative between the two modes, and that is a middle as well as safe ground, which will confer the right of nomination upon the president, and leave the power of appointment to the Senate. The jealous scrutiny of that body will at all times operate as a powerful and sufficient check upon the abuse of executive power. The subordi- nate officers, may be chosen by the board of directors or in any other manner which after experience may dictate. It would be superfluous to remark, that a, supervisory power of investigating the affairs and controlling the bank, should be retained by the national legislature. The immediate representatives of the people, who are the actual and beneficiary stockholders should be enabled to restrain all imprudent excesses or a,buses into which the board of directors might be betrayed; and should maintain a vigilant and predominant supervision of all their acts; and essentially control the whole circulat- 1 ing medium of the country. Such a power can be no where so safely lodged as in the hands of a free people. I ha,ve spoken at some length on this subject because I feel strongly impressed with its importance. The control-of the circulating medium -of the country, is as necessary to its salutary administration, as is that of any other department of its interests. If banking powers be valuable in promoting an equal and safe circulation, then it is obvious tha,t it belongs to the government to direct and superintend the distribution and exercise of those powers. It is a portion, and one of peculiar interest too, of ·the sovereign authority; and to surrender it into the hands of a few private, and in a political sense, irrespon- sible individuals, would be as repugnant to the true spirit of our insti- tutions, as to subject the management of the war or navy departments to such partial and unpledged hands. Private corporations, like pri• vate individuals, may have interests diverse and incompatible with
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